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Corporate Piety and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby's Extension of RFRA
Rights to the For-Profit Corporation
Abstract
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) applied to for-profit corporations and, on that basis, it allowed Hobby Lobby to omit
otherwise mandated contraceptive coverage from its employee healthcare package. Critics argue that the
Court’s novel expansion of corporate rights is fundamentally inconsistent with the basic principles of
corporate law. In particular, they contend that the decision ignores the fact that the corporation, as an artificial
entity, cannot exercise religion in its own right, and they decry the notion that the law might look through the
corporate veil to protect the corporate owners’ rights even while having the veil shield the owners from
liability for the corporation’s wrongs.
In addition to these (supposed) deviations from corporate law principles, commentators express deep
concern about Hobby Lobby’s implications. Will the decision apply not just to closely-held corporations but to
publicly traded ones as well? If so, how should courts deal with disagreement among shareholders about the
religious convictions the corporation should adopt? Will the Court-sanctioned exemption from the
contraceptive mandate open the door to other religiously-based exemptions from healthcare coverage that the
Affordable Care Act requires—blood transfusions for the corporation owned by Jehovah’s Witnesses, or any
form of medicine other than faith healing for the corporation owned by Christian Scientists? And does the
notion of corporate religious rights threaten to justify corporate invocations of other rights—perhaps even
Second Amendment rights to bear arms, or rights of the corporation to vote in political elections?
This Article focuses on the corporate law aspects of the decision, and it seeks to respond to the groundswell of
reactions among corporate law scholars. I argue here that much of the consternation results from mistaken
notions about the nature of the corporation and the rights that its owners may enjoy. The ambition here,
however, is not merely to correct misconceptions. This Article seeks to offer a theory of what the corporation
is, what it is for, and why we might ascribe religious rights to it in the first place—considerations that elucidate
just what Hobby Lobby should, and should not, portend. I argue that constitutional rights should be ascribed
to a corporation when it is necessary to protect the constitutional rights of its controlling members. To that
end, I provide a way of determining just who the corporation’s controlling members are. At the same time, I
seek to elucidate, and ultimately cabin, the scope of corporate religious freedom by considering the burdens
that an exemption might impose on third parties. In this way, the Article’s theoretical contributions aim to
forestall the parade of horribles that Hobby Lobby otherwise threatens to unleash.
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CORPORATE PIETY AND IMPROPRIETY:
HOBBY LOBBY’S EXTENSION OF RFRA
RIGHTS TO THE FOR-PROFIT
CORPORATION
AMY J. SEPINWALL*
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., the Supreme Court held, for the first time,
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) applied to for-profit corpo-
rations and, on that basis, it allowed Hobby Lobby to omit otherwise mandated
contraceptive coverage from its employee healthcare package. Critics argue that
the Court’s novel expansion of corporate rights is fundamentally inconsistent
with the basic principles of corporate law. In particular, they contend that the
decision ignores the fact that the corporation, as an artificial entity, cannot ex-
ercise religion in its own right, and they decry the notion that the law might look
through the corporate veil to protect the corporate owners’ rights even while
having the veil shield the owners from liability for the corporation’s wrongs.
In addition to these (supposed) deviations from corporate law principles,
commentators express deep concern about Hobby Lobby’s implications. Will the
decision apply not just to closely-held corporations but to publicly traded ones
as well? If so, how should courts deal with disagreement among shareholders
about the religious convictions the corporation should adopt? Will the Court-
sanctioned exemption from the contraceptive mandate open the door to other
religiously-based exemptions from healthcare coverage that the Affordable Care
Act requires—blood transfusions for the corporation owned by Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses, or any form of medicine other than faith healing for the corporation
owned by Christian Scientists? And does the notion of corporate religious rights
threaten to justify corporate invocations of other rights—perhaps even Second
Amendment rights to bear arms, or rights of the corporation to vote in political
elections?
This Article focuses on the corporate law aspects of the decision, and it
seeks to respond to the groundswell of reactions among corporate law scholars.
I argue here that much of the consternation results from mistaken notions about
the nature of the corporation and the rights that its owners may enjoy.
The ambition here, however, is not merely to correct misconceptions. This
Article seeks to offer a theory of what the corporation is, what it is for, and why
we might ascribe religious rights to it in the first place—considerations that
elucidate just what Hobby Lobby should, and should not, portend. I argue that
constitutional rights should be ascribed to a corporation when it is necessary to
protect the constitutional rights of its controlling members. To that end, I pro-
vide a way of determining just who the corporation’s controlling members are.
At the same time, I seek to elucidate, and ultimately cabin, the scope of corpo-
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meetings of the Society for Business Ethics and Academy of Legal Studies in Business for
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rate religious freedom by considering the burdens that an exemption might im-
pose on third parties. In this way, the Article’s theoretical contributions aim to
forestall the parade of horribles that Hobby Lobby otherwise threatens to
unleash.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Do for-profit corporations have a right to religious freedom? And are
the owners of a corporation permitted to “reverse pierce”1 the corporate veil
to exercise their constitutional rights, even while claiming the protections of
the veil to limit their liability for the corporation’s wrongs? The Supreme
Court, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc.,2 answered both questions in the
affirmative,3 holding that the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA)4 applied to for-profit corporations, and grounding the exten-
sion of RFRA rights on the free exercise rights of the corporation’s owners.
Because the Court went on to find that the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA)
“contraceptive mandate”5 failed RFRA’s test for establishing when a neutral
law of general application may burden religious exercise,6 the Court con-
cluded that the for-profit corporations before it were entitled to an exemp-
1 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the Free
Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 235 (2013).
2 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
3 The two questions track the two key arguments advanced in the Corporate Law Profes-
sors’ amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby. The brief effectively urged the Court
to answer “no” to both questions. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law
Professors in Support of Petitioners at 14, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, (Nos. 13-354, 13-
356), 2014 WL 333889, at *14 [hereinafter Corporate Law Professors’ Brief].
4 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2013).
5 I join Marty Lederman and others in thinking that the term “mandate” is misleading
here. See Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III—There Is No “Employer Mandate,”
BALKINIZATION (Dec. 18, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-part-
iiitheres-no-employer.html. For the relevant portion of the Affordable Care Act, see Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2013).
6 RFRA states, in relevant part, that the “[g]overnment may substantially burden a per-
son’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2013).
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tion.7 The Court thus ruled that the companies could offer their employees a
health insurance package that excluded forms of contraception the corporate
owners found objectionable.
In this way, Hobby Lobby expanded corporate rights in a manner that
corporate law scholars have deemed “unprecedented”8 and fundamentally
inconsistent with the basic principles of corporate law.9 This Article argues
against this tide of critical commentary.10 Drawing on insights about corpo-
rate “personhood”11 and corporate constitutional rights that I develop else-
where,12 I offer a qualified defense of the decision. In particular, I argue that
the Court was right to reject the notion that corporations can exercise relig-
ion and right to hold that we should nonetheless confer free exercise rights
7 Hobby Lobby consolidated two cases involving claims of conscientious objection on the
part of three employers. In the first case, on appeal to the Tenth Circuit, two closely-held
corporations owned by the Green family—Hobby Lobby, Inc., a chain of craft stores, and
Mardel, Inc., a publisher of Christian texts—challenged the contraceptive mandate and won.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013). In the second case, on
appeal to the Third Circuit, Conestoga Wood, a closely-held corporation owned by the Hahn
family that manufactures kitchen cabinets, also challenged the contraceptive mandate, but lost.
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). For ease of exposition, I refer in the text only to Hobby Lobby,
though everything I say about it applies to Mardel and Conestoga, unless otherwise indicated.
8 Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, The New Law of Religion,
SLATE (July 3, 2014, 11:54 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurispru-
dence/2014/07/after_hobby_lobby_there_is_only_rfra_and_that_s_all_you_need.single.html.
9 See, e.g., Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 3; Caroline Mala Corbin, Hobby R
Lobby: Religious Liberty for the Elite, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y (July 11, 2014), https://
www.acslaw.org/acsblog/hobby-lobby-religious-liberty-for-the-elite. But see, e.g., Alan J.
Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why
For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014).
10 A key piece of evidence for the consensus view among corporate law professors is the
Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 3, at 3–6, which was signed by forty-four corpo- R
rate law professors at thirty-six law schools accredited by the Association of American Law
Schools. The arguments addressed here have also been given voice in, for example, Caroline
Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 151 (2012); Alan E.
Garfield, The Contraceptive Mandate Debate: Achieving a Sensible Balance, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 1 (2014), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Garfield-
114-Columbia-Law-Review-Sidebar-1.pdf; Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of
Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 305. Stephen Bainbridge offers
a sustained critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Brief. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A
Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE (Mar. 2014), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virgini-
alawreview.org/files/Bainbridge_Final.pdf. However, his article focuses on the brief’s argu-
ments against reverse veil piercing, and his response to those arguments is different from the
response I offer in Part III.A.
11 See, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibil-
ity in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 101 (2012); Amy J. Sepinwall, Respon-
sibility for Group Transgressions (Dec. 16, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown
University) (on file with author).
12 Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate Citizen-
ship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575 (2012). Some of the arguments here were previewed, in a highly
condensed form, in a Washington Post op-ed published before Hobby Lobby was decided. See
Amy J. Sepinwall, Can a Corporation Have a Conscience?, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/can-a-corporation-have-a-conscience/2014/03/21/
951fd6b4-af76-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html.
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upon the corporation as a way of protecting the free exercise rights of the
corporation’s members. At the same time, however, I aim to show that the
theory upon which these arguments rely provides resources for cabining
Hobby Lobby’s application to other bids for religiously-based exemptions.
Some commentators criticize Hobby Lobby for construing for-profit
corporations as entities that can practice religion;13 for expanding the notion
of corporate personhood;14 for carrying forward Citizens’ United’s assertions
of corporate constitutional rights;15 and for allowing corporate owners to as-
sert their constitutional rights through the corporate form even while the
corporate veil protects the owners from incurring the corporation’s liabili-
ties.16 On the other side, critics contend that the decision did not go far
enough. According to these critics, Hobby Lobby ought to have recognized
that there is no principled distinction between non-profit and for-profit cor-
porations when it comes to religious exercise.17 If churches can practice re-
ligion, then so too can Chick-fil-A, or Hobby Lobby, or perhaps even Wal-
Mart and other publicly traded companies.18
As I shall argue, some of this commentary rests on mistaken readings of
the case, and much of it rests on confusion about what the corporation is,
what capacities it enjoys, and what rights its owners can claim. More specifi-
cally, I shall contend that the decision did not proclaim that corporations are
persons, capable of exercising religion. Nor should it have done so. Thus, in
Part I, I argue that no corporation can “be” religious or exercise religion. No
corporation, then, is entitled to a religious accommodation in its own right.
13 See, e.g., AZ BlueMeanie, Hobby Lobby Is a Radical Departure from Religious Exer-
cise Jurisprudence, BLOG FOR ARIZ. (June 30, 2014), http://blogforarizona.net/hobby-lobby-is-
a-radical-departure-from-religious-exercise-jurisprudence; Jamie Raskin, The Gospel of Citi-
zens United: In Hobby Lobby, Corporations Pray for the Right to Deny Workers Contracep-
tion, PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY (2014), http://www.pfaw.org/sites/default/files/
HobbyLobby_Mech.pdf.
14 Dahlia Lithwick, Un-People, SLATE (Dec. 3, 2013, 4:43 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/12/hobby_lobby_and_corporate_personhood_
the_alarming_conservative_crusade_to.html (“Corporate Personhood is back! And this time,
it’s got God on its side.”); see also Dana Milbank, In Hobby Lobby Ruling, the Supreme Court
Uses a ‘Fiction’, WASH. POST, (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
dana-milbank-in-hobby-lobby-ruling-the-supreme-court-uses-a-fiction/2014/06/30/37663c72-
009b-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html (“Mitt Romney said it, and [in Hobby Lobby] the
Supreme Court upheld it: Corporations are people, my friend.”); Philip Lorish, And Who Is a
Person? The Problem with Hobby Lobby (Part I), THE HEDGEHOG REV. (July 14, 2014), http://
iasc-culture.org/THR/channels/THR/2014/07/and-who-is-a-person-the-problem-with-hobby-
lobby-part-i/ (claiming that the legal academy’s early commentary concludes that “the most
enduring legacy of Hobby Lobby may not be in the area of religious liberty but, rather, in an
expanded (and expanding) notion of corporate personhood”).
15 See, e.g., Lithwick, supra note 14; Raskin, supra note 13 (contending that Hobby R
Lobby’s “outlandish” claims “would not have [had] a prayer except for Citizens United, the
miracle gift of 2010 that just keeps giving”); Schwartzman, Schragger & Tebbe, supra note 8. R
16 See, e.g., Sepper, supra note 10, at 317. R
17 See, e.g., Mark Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Money-
Makers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 114 (2013).
18 See id. at 74; Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 234 (1994).
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This brings us to the rights of the corporation’s members. We grant
rights of religious freedom to churches and other non-profit corporations
organized to serve religious ends as a way of protecting the free exercise
rights of these corporations’ individual constituents. But this rationale, critics
contend, does not apply to the for-profit corporation, which is not organized
to serve religious ends. In Part II, I take up the claim that limited liability
disqualifies the owners of for-profit corporations from seeking to assert their
rights of religious freedom through the corporate form.
One might think that gaining clarity on the nature of the corporation
and the source of its religious rights is unnecessary in light of the Hobby
Lobby decision. The Court ruled that owners of a closely-held for-profit cor-
poration can claim a religious exemption from the ACA’s contraceptive man-
date if they can establish that the mandate imposes a “substantial burden”
on their religious exercise and the government fails to show that the burden
is motivated by a “compelling interest” served in the “least restrictive”
way.19 Whatever one might think of the cogency of the decision, it is now
the law of the land. One might conclude, then, that there is no point in inter-
rogating the decision’s foundations and implications.
But we should not be so quick to abdicate the scholarly responsibility to
comment, especially where, as here, there is deeply felt concern about what
Hobby Lobby portends.20 Will the decision apply not just to closely-held cor-
porations but to publicly traded ones as well? If so, how should courts deal
with disagreement among shareholders about the religious convictions the
corporation should adopt? Does the notion of corporate religious rights
threaten to justify corporate refusals to cover other health interventions—for
example, life-saving abortions,21 or therapies derived from embryonic stem
cells?22 More sweepingly, if corporations have rights of religious freedom,
must we also accord them other foundational rights—rights to vote in politi-
cal elections,23 or perhaps even Second Amendment rights to bear arms,24 or
19 The quoted language here tracks the key elements in the test that RFRA prescribes.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2013).
20 Cf. Ann Lipton, Yet Another Person Weighs in on Hobby Lobby, BUS. LAW PROF BLOG
(July 12, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/07/yet-another-person-
weighs-in-on-hobby-lobby.html (explaining that “there is something of an obligation for all
corporate law bloggers to weigh in on Hobby Lobby”).
21 See generally Thomas E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul—The Business Entity
Law Response to the PPACA Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 16
(2014) (listing plausible religious objections to corporate funding of psychiatric care, treatment
of illnesses related to the use of alcohol or tobacco, blood transfusions, delivery of babies born
out of wedlock, and vaccination against the HPV virus).
22 Judge Rovner raises this and other hypothetical extensions that would follow from al-
lowing religious exemptions to the contraceptive mandate. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d
654, 689–93 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2903 (2014); see
also Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing further and equally far-reaching
hypothetical pleas for exemptions from the ACA on religious grounds).
23 John Hasnas has recently argued that if one holds that corporations are moral agents,
then, as a matter of logic, one must also hold that corporations are persons. As such, corpora-
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rights to marry humans or other corporations?25 Enhanced clarity on just
what the corporation is, what it is for, and why we might ascribe religious
rights to it in the first place—which this Article seeks to provide—can yield
answers to these questions that elucidate just what Hobby Lobby should, and
should not, entail.
II. CORPORATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM?
When contemplating the issues raised in challenges to the contraceptive
mandate, courts and commentators have divided over the question of
whether for-profit corporations have rights of religious freedom in the first
place. This question has been identified as “the central”26 and “fundamen-
tal”27 question in Hobby Lobby—one of “profound cultural” interest28 and
“a topic of energetic debate in current American political and social
discourse.”29
This Part takes up the core question of whether corporations are the
kind of entities that can be said to exercise religion. Or, more generally, do
corporations have a conscience?30
tions would have rights, including the right to vote in political elections. John Hasnas, Why
Don’t Corporations Have the Right to Vote? (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
24 See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Telling Stories of Shareholder Supremacy, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1049, 1075 (“It remains to be seen whether the Court will extend its new
Second Amendment jurisprudence to grant corporations a protected right to take up arms
against the citizenry, but little in the existing precedents suggests any reason to expect the
Court to hesitate.”).
25 Cf. Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United and the Constitutional Rights of Corporations,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/profes-
sorbainbridgecom/2011/01/citizens-united-and-the-constitutional-rights-of-corporations.html
(describing a protest stunt responding to Citizens United’s (alleged) recognition of corporate
personhood in which a woman held a news conference to announce the start to her search for a
corporate spouse).
26 Raskin, supra note 15, at 9. R
27 Joshua Holland, Supreme Court to Decide Whether Corporations Can Pray, MOYERS &
CO, (Oct. 22, 2013), http://billmoyers.com/2013/10/22/supreme-court-to-decide-whether-cor-
porations-can-pray/.
28 Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Religion, Rights, and the Workplace, SCOTUS-
BLOG (Mar. 20, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/argument-preview-relig-
ion-rights-and-the-workplace/.
29 Id.
30 For scholarly work engaging the relationship between conscience and religious convic-
tion, see, for example, Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious
Exemptions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 214, 215, 215 n.1 (2009) (noting that “[m]any distinguished
legal theorists and philosophers have been drawn to the idea that it is conscience rather than
religion that is entitled to special protection, and the U.S. Supreme Court has sometimes em-
braced the same position” and collecting sources and cases). Nonetheless, the law has been
much more hospitable to religiously-based claims of conscience than moral ones. See, e.g.,
Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457, 1459
nn.7–9 (2013) (collecting cases and statutes supporting and denying exemptions on the basis of
non-religious claims of conscience). Since Hobby Lobby was decided under a statute protect-
ing religious freedom, I focus here only on religious claims of conscience. It is nonetheless
worth noting that many of the paradigmatic instances of conscientious objection contemplate
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Hobby Lobby was decided on the basis of the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act of 1993.31 RFRA provides that:
[The government may] not substantially burden a person’s exer-
cise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, . . . [unless] it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling govern-
mental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.32
RFRA itself does not define the term “person,” so controversy emerged
over whether RFRA applies to for-profit corporations. After all, for-profit
corporations can suffer a substantial burden on their exercise of religion only
if they can exercise religion in the first place, and there is much disagree-
ment about whether they can.
Arguments about corporate religious exercise take one of two forms.
Some of these turn on conceptions of what the corporation is for. Call these
teleological arguments. Other arguments turn on conceptions of what the
corporation is. Call these ontological arguments. I take up each of these in
turn.33
A. Teleological Arguments About Corporate Religious Exercise
As noted above, teleological arguments focus on corporate purpose and
attempt to infer whether for-profit corporations can exercise religion there-
from.34 Those who argue against the exemption on teleological grounds con-
both moral and religious grounds for the objection. See, e.g., Church Amendments, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300a-7(b) (2013) (enacted as part of the Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-45) (mandating that the government not discriminate in its disbursement of public
funds against individuals or entities who refuse to perform abortion or sterilization procedures
because these procedures “would be contrary to [the individual or entity’s] religious beliefs or
moral convictions”); Oregon Death with Dignity Act § 4.01, Or. Rev. Stat § 127.885 (2012)
(recognizing moral and religious objections to physician assisted suicide); 18 U.S.C. § 3597(b)
(2013) (permitting federal employee to absent themselves from executions when the employee
opposes capital punishment on moral or religious grounds).
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (2013).
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
33 Eliding the ontological and teleological questions, Douglas Laycock looks simply to
RFRA’s legislative history and infers therefrom that “Congress left a clear and explicit record
that the public meaning of RFRA covers for-profit corporations and their owners.” Douglas
Laycock, Symposium: Congress Answered This Question: Corporations Are Covered,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-congress-an-
swered-this- question-corporations-are-covered/. Laycock presents convincing evidence sup-
porting Congress’s intention, but the fact that Congress meant for corporations to have
religious freedom does not entail that corporations can exercise religion. The considerations
adduced in this Part are aimed at establishing that they cannot.
34 Lyman Johnson and David Millon argue that Hobby Lobby was remarkable in no small
part because “[n]ever before had the highest court in the land spoken to an issue that goes to
the very foundation of corporate law, namely, corporate purpose.” Lyman Johnson & David K.
Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 22 (2014). This Part will explain
and critique the arguments of jurists and commentators on both sides of this issue.
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tend that for-profit corporations are secular by definition,35 as if a
commitment to turning a profit automatically forecloses an exercise of relig-
ion.36 But there is nothing in the nature of profit-making that restricts the
profit maker from imposing religiously-based constraints on his efforts to
make money. Jews who observe the Sabbath do not work on Saturdays, pre-
sumably losing revenue as a result. And convictions of a secular moral kind
can also limit the ways in which a company will seek to earn money37—for
example, by pursuing philanthropic goals,38 or adopting green policies that
are more expensive than conventional alternatives.39 In short, teleological
arguments do not rule out the notion of a religiously-informed for-profit cor-
poration because there is not one determinate purpose of the for-profit cor-
poration. Instead, there are many different objectives that may legally co-
exist alongside, or constrain, the pursuit of profits, including adherence to a
set of religious convictions.
Moreover, in eschewing a conception of corporate purpose that allows
non-pecuniary values to constrain the pursuit of profit, the dissent unwit-
tingly affirms a vision of the corporation that has been, and deserves to be,
discredited. More specifically, the dissent, and like-minded commentators,40
see the for-profit corporation as steadfastly and exclusively committed to
profit maximization. In this regard, the dissent seems to be channeling
35 See, e.g., Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss and in Op-
position to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 17, Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F.
Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-01 123-JLK) (“Hercules Industries’s overriding
purpose is to make money . . . . By definition, a secular employer does not engage in any
‘exercise of religion.’”) (citations omitted).
36 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770 (2014). (“Some
lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not protect for-profit corporations because
the purpose of such corporations is simply to make money.”); Conestoga Wood Specialties
Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., No. 13-1144, 2013 WL 1277419, at
*4 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2013) (Garth, J., concurring) (noting that the mission of Conestoga, “like
that of any other for-profit, secular business, is to make money in the commercial sphere”)
(citations omitted); Rienzi, supra note 17, at 61 (“Despite the obvious religious focus of these R
businesses, the government has argued that their profit-making nature automatically renders
them ‘secular’ and therefore incapable of religious exercise.”); Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Con-
science Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1547 (2012) (arguing that “[w]ithin for-profit busi-
nesses, even though moral convictions might come into play, the profit motive (in some cases,
an obligation to maximize shareholder wealth) must drive decisionmaking”).
37 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
38 Id. at 2771 n.24.
39 For example, Patagonia, the clothing company, donates one percent of its revenues in
the form of grants for environmental activism. As the company describes, “We fund activists
who take radical and strategic steps to protect habitat, oceans and waterways, wilderness and
biodiversity. This is our niche: supporting people working on the frontlines of the environmen-
tal crisis.” Environmental Grants and Support, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/us/pat-
agonia.go?assetid=2927 (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). It is difficult to see how these grants
could enhance Patagonia’s profitability, since it is unlikely that activists on the frontlines de-
velop strategies or technologies that make Patagonia more efficient. And Patagonia could
likely earn an equivalent public relations benefit were it to donate just a fraction of what it
currently does. This is all to say that Patagonia appears to sacrifice profits for the sake of its
commitment to the environment.
40 See, e.g., Sepper, supra note 36, at 1547. R
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Milton Friedman’s infamous precept that “there is one and only one social
responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities de-
signed to increase profits . . . .”41 Friedman (and his acolytes) are wrong both
as a matter of law and as a matter of logic.
The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance,
which endeavor to synthesize corporate law doctrines, state that the law al-
lows the corporation to recognize legal and ethical considerations as well as
to devote reasonable resources to philanthropic, educational, humanitarian,
and public welfare purposes.42 Further, as other scholars have noted, the bus-
iness judgment rule effectively insulates corporate officers from challenges
to philanthropic or social responsibility initiatives that they institute.43
Moreover, even if one subscribes to the view that the corporation
should be run exclusively in the interests of its owners or shareholders,44 it
does not follow that the corporation’s exclusive purpose should be to maxi-
mize share value. Friedman’s argument embodies the logical flaw in ques-
tion: he asserts that (1) the primary responsibility of corporate executives is
“to conduct the business in accordance with [owners’] desires,”45 (2) the
primary desire of the owners is “to make as much money as possible”
within the bounds of the law,46 and so (3) “[t]here is one, and only one,
social responsibility of business”—“to make as much money as possible.”47
Even if Friedman is right as a matter of fact that the owners’ primary desire
is to make as much money as possible, it does not follow that this is their
only desire, and so we need not conclude that maximizing profits is the only
legitimate corporate purpose. Indeed, many owners have competing desires
when it comes to the corporation’s objectives, and even those who would put
profit making at the top of the list might nonetheless have moral taboos that
they would want to have operate as side constraints on the means of turning
41 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
42 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01(b)(2)–(3) (1994) (stating that corporations may be run in light of “ethical considera-
tions that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business” even
when so doing reduces the firm’s profitability); see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763–70 (2005) (invoking state statutes
and case law, as well as federal law, in support of the American Law Institute’s statement that
corporations need not steadfastly seek to maximize profits).
43 See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776, 778–80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Lynn A.
Stout, The Problem of Corporate Purpose, 48 ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE STUDIES 1, 5 (2012)
(describing how courts have applied the business judgment rule).
44 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Mak-
ing Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 23, 23 (1991) (stating that corporations and their directors “owe fiduciary duties to share-
holders and to shareholders alone”). It is worth noting that progressive corporate law scholars
strongly, and to my mind, convincingly, contest the view that shareholders are the owners of a
publicly traded corporation. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-so-Bad Arguments for
Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1190, 1190–92 (2002).
45 FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 1. R
46 Id.
47 Id. at 6.
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a profit. For example, owners otherwise committed to maximizing profits
might object to profits earned through child labor, or the sale of arms to
genocidal rebels, or the exploitation of poor and vulnerable populations. The
fact that these owners take profit-making to be the thing they most desire
from the corporation does not entail that they desire that the corporation
make a profit at any and all (moral) costs.48 Moreover, it is just not the case
that all shareholders would identify profit-making as the objective to which
the corporation should be primarily, let alone exclusively, devoted. The rise
of benefit corporations demonstrates as much.49
In short, given that the law permits corporations to pursue religious
objectives even at the expense of profit maximization,50 the dissent fails to
establish that profit-making is incompatible with religious exercise. Com-
mentators however, have offered other possible reasons for thinking that re-
ligious observance cannot be among Hobby Lobby’s purposes.
For example, some have argued that Hobby Lobby must not genuinely
care about contraceptive methods since it invests in companies that manu-
facture the contraceptive methods to which it allegedly objects.51 The invest-
ments in question reside in generic mutual funds that include stock in major
pharmaceutical companies, including one that produces Plan B, one of the
four contraceptive methods contested in the case.52 Commentators voicing
this argument concede that “the investment funds have very small stakes in
these pharmaceutical firms overall.”53 Nonetheless, given that Hobby Lobby
could instead invest in religious mutual funds that exclude companies manu-
48 There are additional problems with Friedman’s argument that other corporate law and
business ethics scholars have powerfully exposed, most notably that Friedman mistakenly
treats shareholders as the owners of the corporation. See, e.g., David Millon, Communitarian-
ism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW 1, 9–10 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Stout, supra note 44, at 1191. R
49 See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifica-
tions and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 26 (2012).
50 See generally Meese & Oman, supra note 9. R
51 See, e.g., Molly Redden, Hobby Lobby’s Hypocrisy: The Company’s Retirement Plan
Invests in Contraception Manufacturers, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 1, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/hobby-lobby-retirement-plan-invested-emergency-
contraception-and-abortion-drug-makers (accusing Hobby Lobby of hypocrisy and noting the
availability of faith-based investing plans that screen for companies manufacturing abortion
drugs). This is hardly a “gotcha” of the kind that undermines the Court’s decision, however,
for the same reasons I go on to adduce in the text that follows. See infra text accompanying
note 55. R
52 Heather Long, Hobby Lobby Does Invest in Birth Control, CNN MONEY (July 2, 2014,
11:10 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/01/investing/hobby-lobby-401k-contraception/
(“Employees have the option to put their retirement dollars—and the money that Hobby
Lobby contributes on their behalf—into over a dozen different mutual funds. At least eight of
those funds have been invested in companies that produce contraceptives such as Teva Phar-
maceutical (TEVA), Bayer (BAYRY), and Pfizer (PFE), according to a CNNMoney analysis.
Teva makes Plan B. At least one fund also held Forest Laboratories, which makes a drug that is
used to induce abortions.”).
53 Id.
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facturing contraceptives, Hobby Lobby’s investment decisions seem to be at
odds with its asserted religious convictions.
What are we to make of this seeming inconsistency? The answer, is not
much. Religious observance can appear wildly inconsistent from the outside.
Sometimes the believer can offer a rationale for practices that appear to de-
part from her religious convictions and, in this way, she can eliminate the
appearance of inconsistency. At other times, the only explanation is that the
believer is doing the best she can and surely some observance is better than
none. It seems doubtful, and undesirable at any rate, that only those who
adhere perfectly to their religious convictions should be eligible for religious
accommodation.54
With that said, inconsistencies can be relevant to assessing the sincerity
of Hobby Lobby’s asserted beliefs.55 Suppose that Hobby Lobby cares not a
whit about embryonic life, and is merely being opportunistic by seeking an
exemption from the contraceptive mandate because of potential cost savings.
The case would then have been wrongly decided with respect to Hobby
Lobby. But Hobby Lobby’s insincerity would not impugn the Court’s hold-
ing as applied to a for-profit closely-held corporation with sincere objections
to some or all of the contraceptive methods mandated under the ACA. That
is, the reasoning of the case does not rise or fall on the sincerity of Hobby
Lobby’s beliefs because there are presumably other religious for-profit em-
ployers who do have sincere objections to contraceptive coverage.
In sum, if the corporation is unfit to exercise religion, this cannot be
because adhering to religious precepts can form no part of any for-profit
corporation’s purpose. It must instead be because the corporation is not the
kind of entity that can be religious in the first instance. I turn to such argu-
ments now.
B. Ontological Arguments About Corporate Religious Exercise
Ontological arguments about whether corporations can exercise relig-
ious freedom turn on competing conceptions of the nature of the corporation
itself. Notably, both the majority and dissent agree that the corporation is an
artificial being,56 as do many corporate law scholars, who hold the view that
the corporation is nothing but a nexus of contracts.57 For those who deny that
54 See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (upholding a Jehovah’s Witness’s relig-
ious objection to participating in the manufacture of tanks even though the objector did not
oppose participating in the manufacture of steel that he knew would be used to build tanks).
55 Sincerity is a criterion courts typically assess in determining whether to grant an exemp-
tion under RFRA, though the Court in Hobby Lobby had no occasion to do so because “no one
ha[d] disputed the sincerity of their religious beliefs.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014).
56 See id. at 2769; id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
57 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418, 1426 (1989); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts
Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449,
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the corporation is real, the idea that it can practice religion in its own right is
a non-starter.58 Again, the majority and dissent are in agreement here.59 The
majority and dissent part ways, however, when it comes to the implications
of the corporation’s fictitious nature: the dissent takes the corporation’s artifi-
ciality to entail that for-profit corporations cannot practice religion and con-
cludes that for-profit corporations therefore do not have rights under
RFRA.60 This conclusion is too hasty for even if the corporation does not
enjoy RFRA protection in its own right, it might make sense to confer this
protection on the corporation as a way of respecting the corporate owners’
rights of religious freedom. This is precisely the response the majority of-
fers, and it is also the response that explains why questions of corporate
religious exercise are a red herring.
Nonetheless, some commentators have sought to argue that corpora-
tions, including for-profit corporations, are the kinds of entities that can
practice religion in their own right.61 It is worth pausing to consider their
arguments because, if accepted, they have potentially radical implications, as
we can glean from analogous arguments holding that a corporation is a
moral agent in its own right.
To be a moral agent is to be capable of knowing right and wrong and
acting in light of this knowledge, and so to be capable of being blamed or
praised for the acts the moral agent commits. Once the corporation is con-
ceived as being a moral agent, it may be held responsible for its acts even if
none of its members are responsible for them.62 According to those who
1449 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Non-
shareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266,
1269 (1999).
58 The claim that an artificial entity cannot exercise religion is analogous to the standard
line in the law and economics movement about corporate ownership—that as a nexus of con-
tracts, the corporation cannot own itself, nor can anyone else own it. See, e.g., Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 547, 564–65 (2003); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288, 290 (1980).
59 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769–70 (arguing that the corporation is a fictitious
legal construct, incapable of exercising religion in its own right); id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he exercise of religion is characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal
entities.”).
60 Id.; see also Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (“General business corporations do not,
separate and apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees,
exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-
motivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of their individual ac-
tors.”) (emphasis added); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F.Supp.2d 394,
408 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“Religious belief takes shape within the minds and hearts of individuals,
and its protection is one of the more uniquely ‘human’ rights provided by the Constitution.”).
61 See, e.g., Ronald Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 88 (2014)
(“It is time to connect the dots, and explicitly recognize the ability of for-profit corporations to
invoke the protections of the Free Exercise Clause.”); Johnson & Millon, supra note 34, at 23; R
Rienzi, supra note 17, at 63. R
62 See, e.g., MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 129 (2000); Philip Pet-
tit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171, 177 (2007). It might seem implausible to
think that a corporation could bear responsibility for some act—a wrong, say—even though
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subscribe to the notion of corporate moral agency, the corporation is deemed
to have its own capacities for knowledge and volition.63 These capacities
sustain the corporation’s moral agency, and so it bears its own moral respon-
sibility. In brief, if a corporation is a moral agent, then it must be
autonomous.
An analogous form of autonomy underpins claims that the corporation
itself can be a religious adherent. As such, the corporation could have relig-
ious convictions that none of its members shared.64 Consider, for example, a
closely-held corporation established by a Catholic owner who embedded
Catholic precepts in the corporation’s charter. Even if the owner subse-
quently converted to some other religion, and even if no one else in the
corporation cared whether the corporation continued to act on Catholic
precepts, the corporation would still continue to adhere to Catholicism so
long as its charter remained the same. More to the point, the corporation
would, according to those who subscribe to this version of corporate per-
sonhood, be Catholic, in the sense that it was guided by Catholic precepts
and its commitments functioned to cause its members, when acting on behalf
of the corporation, to abide by these precepts. In this way, the corporation
would have a religious identity that none of its members shared. And, most
relevant for our purposes, such a corporation could seek exemptions on re-
ligious grounds from legal requirements to which none of its owners, em-
ployees, customers, and so on objected. It is in this sense, then, that the
notion of a religious corporation has radical implications, and so deserves
our attention.
Broadly speaking, there are three kinds of arguments for the claim that
corporations can exercise religion, or be religious. First, supporters argue
that we frequently ascribe moral properties to businesses—for example, re-
ferring to them as “greedy” or “generous”—which implies that we think of
them as being moral in their own right. If corporations are moral beings,
they continue, surely they can be religious beings too. Second, we ascribe
mental states to corporations, as where we hold a corporation criminally lia-
ble because of what it knew or intended. This suggests that corporations
none of its individual members were culpable in her own right. But this possibility is not
merely the stuff of philosophical fancy. In United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d
844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987), for example, the First Circuit held that a bank could be said to know
that withdrawals had exceeded the level above which reporting was necessary when some
tellers knew the amount of the withdrawals in question but did not know the reporting limits,
and other bank employees knew the reporting limits but did not know the amount of the
withdrawals. The court found that the knowledge of a corporation “is the sum of the knowl-
edge of all of the employees,” id. at 855, and in that way the court was able to impute to the
corporation a crime of which none of its individual members was culpable.
63 See, e.g., CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN,
AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 165–67 (2011); Peter A. French, The Corporation as a
Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 207 (1979); Pettit, supra note 62, at 171–72. R
64 Johnson and Millon allow for this possibility, stating that “if the corporation itself en-
joys religious liberty, its rights exist separately . . . and would exist . . . even if some—or even
all—of its shareholders or directors were atheists and derived no benefit from the corporation’s
exercise of its own right.” See Johnson & Millon, supra note 34, at 18. R
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have a capacity for belief, and a capacity to act in accordance with the be-
liefs they form. Finally, corporations sometimes take actions in conformity
with religious precepts (for example, closing on the Sabbath), which is a
form of exercising religion.65
None of these arguments are convincing, however. When we ascribe
moral properties to a corporation, we might mean for them to attach to the
corporation itself. But we might instead just be using a shorthand. Thus,
when we call a corporation “greedy,” what we really might mean to say is
that “the corporation is being run in a way that would qualify as greedy if
the corporation were a person” or “the managers of the corporation are run-
ning it in a greedy way.” In short, we cannot discern from our discourse
whether we in fact think of the corporation as moral or immoral in its own
right.66
The second argument draws an analogy between our practice of holding
corporations criminally liable for their wrongs and the notion of corporate
religious exercise. As Mark Rienzi writes, “It is unclear what principled
reason would justify viewing a corporation as capable of forming and acting
upon criminal intentions but incapable of forming and acting upon religious
ones.”67 In response, it is worth noting that at least some arguments for cor-
porate criminal liability do not turn on the notion that corporations can form
and act upon criminal intentions; instead, these arguments justify punishing
corporations on deterrence-based grounds alone.68 But even if corporations
do have the capacity to form and act upon criminal intentions, that capacity
may demand less than the capacity to form and act upon a religious inten-
tion. To act on a criminal intention, it is not necessary that one know that
one’s conduct is criminal at the time one acts, less still that one commit the
act precisely because it is criminal. Not so for religious conduct. To qualify
as a religious exercise, the actor should not only act in accordance with a
religious precept, he should be motivated to so act precisely because his
religion instructs him to.69 This is not to say that one must feel motivated by
65 All three arguments can be found in Rienzi, see supra note 17, at 81, 85–86, 110, but R
other commentators raise one or more of them as well. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand & Barak
D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 DUKE L.J. 769, 771–73 (2015);
Meese & Oman, supra note 9, at 278–79. R
66 I elaborate on this point in Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy, supra note 11, at 423–24. R
67 Rienzi, supra note 17, at 89; cf. Eric Posner, Stop Fussing over Personhood, SLATE R
(Dec. 11, 2013 10:09 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chica
go/2013/12/personhood_for_corporations_and_chimpanzees_is_an_essential_legal_fiction
.html (acknowledging that the mental states in question reside with the corporation’s individual
members, not the corporation itself, but also stating that “the law already treats corporations as
capable of being reckless or negligent; of having intentions, beliefs, and states of mind. If it
didn’t, then it would be impossible to hold a corporation guilty of committing a crime.”).
68 See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 323
(1996); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1477, 1494–95 (1996).
69 In some characterizations, the notion of motivation is at the core of what RFRA aims to
protect. See, e.g., Laycock & Thomas, supra note 18, at 210 (arguing that RFRA is intended to R
protect “religiously motivated conduct”).
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one’s religious commitments in each and every instance; presumably, regular
observance becomes a habit and so occurs reflexively.70 Nonetheless, it
should at least be the case that one could be made to feel the force of the
motivation—for example, when circumstances tempt one to do otherwise, or
when called upon to explain or justify one’s observance.
If I am right that religious exercise requires more than mere compliance
with the rules and practices of a religion, then the third argument—that cor-
porations sometimes act in accordance with religious precepts71—fails as
well. To see this, consider that vegans are necessarily kosher, because the
prohibitions vegans follow overlap with those that Kashrut mandates.72 But
it would be a mistake to think that every vegan engages in an exercise of
Judaism. The motivation for veganism is different from the motivation to
live a life in accordance with Jewish precepts around eating. To qualify as an
instance of the latter, one has to know and affirm the Jewish dietary laws,
and make choices about what and how one eats precisely because of those
laws.
More generally, religious exercise requires more than merely forming
and acting on intentions. Rienzi seems to agree. He states, “The exercise of
religion is not limited to actions or abstentions required by a person’s relig-
ion, but rather includes actions and abstentions motivated by religion.”73
Motivation matters when it comes to religious exercise. But motivation is
different from intention and it relies on a different capacity. In particular,
motivation depends on certain conative and affective states—in the case of
religious motivation, a desire to do right, and a fear of the consequences of
doing wrong, respectively. I have argued elsewhere that the corporation does
not possess the capacities necessary to experience these states.74 I will not
rehearse these arguments here, though I think one can readily grasp what is
at stake if one merely reflects on what it feels like to be motivated. This
70 Cf. DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 76–89 (2012) (explaining that
the distinctive feature of habits, as well as policies, is that, once adopted, they function like
exclusionary reasons or reasons that preclude a case-by-case weighing of competing
considerations).
71 See, e.g., Meese & Oman, supra note 9, at 278 (“Some lower courts have asserted that R
‘for-profit, secular corporations cannot engage in religious exercise.’ As an empirical matter,
this claim is false. Shareholder-induced pursuit of religion is common.”) (quoting Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377,
381 (3d Cir. 2013)).
72 For a description of the Jewish dietary laws, see Kashrut: Jewish Dietary Laws, JUDA-
ISM 101, http://www.jewfaq.org/kashrut.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). For a description of
the foods veganism permits and forbids, see What Do Vegans Eat?, VEGAN OUTREACH, http://
veganoutreach.org/what-to-eat/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
73 Rienzi, supra note 17, at 65 (basing his argument on Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. R
of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Sherbert v. Vernor,
374 U.S. 398 (1963), Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), and Cleveland v. United
States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946)) (emphasis added).
74 Amy J. Sepinwall, Monsters, Incorporated: Why Corporations Aren’t Persons and Why
We Shouldn’t Care Anyway, (Feb. 19, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author);
see also Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy, supra note 11 (arguing that the question of corporate R
moral capacity is “likely unanswerable”).
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feeling is not a mere appendage to motivation, an experience that just hap-
pens to go along with being motivated. Instead, it is constitutive of motiva-
tion—feeling that feeling is part and parcel of what it is to be motivated.
Further, acting on conscience requires more still. Underpinning a com-
mitment to some set of precepts and the motivation that the commitment
affords is a kind of self-awareness—a conception of oneself as a certain kind
of person, that is, one who lives her life by the commitments in question. It
is in this sense that religious conscience is deeply bound up with identity,75
and it is because of the connection between conscience and identity that the
law recognizes and sometimes accedes to conscientious objection. As
Michael Sandel puts it, “the free exercise of religion enjoy[s] special consti-
tutional protection . . . [because of] the role that religion plays in the lives of
those for whom the observance of religious duties is a constitutive end, es-
sential to their good and indispensable to their identity.”76
The centrality of motivation to religious experience, and identity to
claims of conscience, make clear the reason for which corporations them-
selves cannot act on conscience. Corporations do not have a capacity for
motivation, and they do not have the self-awareness that would allow a per-
son to carve out an identity for herself, and set an agenda for the way she
will live out her life in light of her deepest commitments. Without motiva-
tion or self-awareness, then, the corporation’s acts might be in line with what
a given religion requires, but the corporation does not act religiously—it
does not, that is, exercise religion.77
At this point, the proponent of corporate religious exercise might com-
plain that the considerations adduced to deny that a corporation can be relig-
ious impugn not just a for-profit entity’s claims of free exercise but also
those of a church. After all, it is not as if a church possesses cognitive,
conative, or affective capacities that a for-profit corporation lacks.78 But it
75 See, e.g., KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 99 (2005) (arguing that
claims of religious conscience are “likely to represent deeply constitutive aspects of people’s
identity”); Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should They
Be Accommodated?, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 47, 49 (2010) (noting that conscience, in its “mod-
ern usage connotes something stronger, that she would disregard a deep aspect of her identity
if she went along”); cf. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM 67
(2005) (focusing on the relevance of religious convictions and stating that “believers under-
stand the requirements of religious beliefs and actions as central rather than peripheral to their
identity”).
76 MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE xii (1998).
77 I note that similar considerations should undermine the claim that the corporation has a
conscience. For arguments on the other side, see, for example, Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John
B. Matthews, Jr., Can a Corporation Have a Conscience?, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 1982, avail-
able at https://hbr.org/1982/01/can-a-corporation-have-a-conscience/ar/1 (arguing that a “cor-
poration can and should have a conscience”); Mary Ann Glendon, Free Businesses to Act with
Conscience, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/12/08/
should-business-have-conscience/cK6o6G6dwrWeRJjk1uPVYM/story.html.
78 Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014) (“[N]o con-
ceivable [legal] definition of the term [“person”] includes natural persons and nonprofit cor-
porations, but not for-profit corporations.”).
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makes no sense to say that a church is not religious, the objector might
continue. And so a for-profit corporation must be religious too.79
In response, I note that the objector is right to think that we should not
distinguish between churches and for-profit entities in an analysis of corpo-
rate conscience, or corporate religious exercise.80 Churches, like for-profit
corporations, lack a capacity for motivation or emotion, and in addition, a
sense of self. We might sometimes speak as if churches have a conscience.81
But again our speech is either an elliptical reference to the leaders of the
organization,82 or else it is metaphoric—that is, a shorthand for, “the organi-
zation has acted in a way that would cause pride or serenity (or shame or
guilt) in an individual with a conscience.” And it is no embarrassment to the
church that it cannot be religious in the way that an individual can be, just as
it is no embarrassment to a zygote, or a chimpanzee, or a spotted owl that it
cannot be a person in the way an adult human can be.83 Moreover, we might
have reason to care deeply about the church (just as we might have reason to
care about the spotted owl, chimpanzee, or even a zygote)84 that do not turn
on whether it shares the metaphysical capacities of persons. Concepts like
79 Nate Oman raises this objection in a comment to a blog post I wrote, to which I re-
sponded, echoing the considerations I provide in the text of this Article in the paragraphs
immediately following this footnote. See Amy Sepinwall, Replying to Ronald Columbo on
Corporate RFRA Rights, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 16, 2014), http://www.theconglomerate
.org/2014/07/replying-to-ronald-columbo-on-corporate-rfra-rights.html. Professor Oman’s
comment argues that “[e]quating the religious in religious freedom with you [sic] more de-
manding definition of religion seems to have the bizarre result that churches not only are not
entitled to religious freedom but also aren’t even religious.” Id.
80 Cf. Haskell Murray, Lyman Johnson—Hobby Lobby, a Landmark Corporate Law Deci-
sion, BUS. LAW PROF BLOG (July 2, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/
2014/07/lyman-johnson-hobby-lobby-a-landmark-corporate-law-decision.html (“[T]he U.S.
failed to convince the Court that corporations as such cannot exercise religion because, let’s
face it, our nation is full of churches and other religious bodies where religion quite obviously
is being exercised in and through the corporate form.”).
81 See Joseph P. Marren, Catholic Church Should Be Ashamed, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 6, 2010),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-04-06/opinion/chi-100406marren_briefs_1_catholic-
bishops-catholic-church-ashamed.
82 The article quoted in the previous footnote bears the headline, “Catholic Church Should
Be Ashamed,” but its very first sentence makes clear that the author’s ire is directed at the
leaders of the Church, not the Church itself: “The pope and the Catholic bishops are an embar-
rassment to the church.” Id.
83 The examples here are drawn from Eric Posner, supra note 67, who argues that per- R
sonhood is sometimes a purely legal concept, in which case it denominates all those entities
that enjoy a certain class of legal rights. This argument says nothing about the metaphysical
capacities about the entities so denominated.
84 It may be worth noting that theorists across the ideological spectrum—in particular,
those who both support and deny the claim that personhood begins at conception—can none-
theless agree that we have reason to care deeply about prenatal life, including prenatal life
from its earliest inception (that is, zygotes). See e.g., Margaret O. Little, The Morality of Abor-
tion, in A COMPANION TO APPLIED ETHICS 313, 321 (R. G. Frey & Christopher Heath Wellman
eds., 2003) (arguing that one can embrace the moral permissibility of abortion and yet believe
that abortions are nonetheless regrettable—oftentimes even tragic); Robert P. George (joined
by Alfonso Go´mez-Lobo), Personal Statement, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN
ETHICAL INQUIRY 258 (President’s Council on Bioethics 2002) (contending that personhood
begins at the time a human is conceived).
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“religious” or “person” have more or less robust meanings. The church is
religious in the narrow sense that it is run in accordance with religious
precepts; it is not religious in the more robust sense that we have in mind
when we contemplate, for example, the individual who is pious, reverent, or
devoted. Put another way, the church is not a religious devotee, though its
members are.
The fact that the corporation cannot exercise religion in its own right
has important implications for its standing under RFRA: RFRA seeks to
protect only those beings capable of exercising religion in the robust sense
just adduced. The rationale for granting exemptions from legal requirements
turns on the anticipated suffering or guilt that the religious adherent would
experience were she compelled by law to violate some tenet of her religion.85
This suffering or guilt would result from the religious adherent’s sense that in
acting against her conscience she betrays herself.86 If the corporation cannot
experience guilt and if it lacks a sense of self, then it makes no sense to think
that the corporation is entitled, in its own right, to exemptions from laws that
interfere with the religious precepts informing the way it is run. Corpora-
tions are thus not religious in the sense contemplated by RFRA.
In sum, corporations lack the capacities that are required for religious
exercise: they cannot be moved to act in accordance with religious require-
ments, they cannot experience guilt when they violate one of these require-
ments, and they do not possess a conscience. If we are to recognize for-profit
corporations’ RFRA rights, then, it must be because the corporation’s owners
may assert their own RFRA rights through the corporate form.
III. RIGHTS OF OWNERS
This is, of course, precisely the basis upon which the Hobby Lobby
majority grounds its extension of RFRA to the for-profit corporation.87
Rather than rehearse the majority’s arguments here, with which I agree, I
seek to counter those that the dissent and commentators have offered in re-
sponse. In particular, I focus on two arguments: first, that limited liability is
85 See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 164–74 (2008); Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Re-
ligious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770 (2013) (reviewing BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RE-
LIGION? (2013)).
86 See, e.g., Christine Korsgaard, Conscience 1 (1996), http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/
~korsgaar/CMK.Conscience.E.Ed.pdf (“Conscience . . . is most commonly thought of as the
source of pains we suffer as a result of doing what we believe is wrong—the pains of guilt, or
‘pangs of conscience.’”); cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Shame Creeps Through Guilt and Feels Like
Retribution, 18 L. & PHIL. 327, 336 (1999) (“[S]hame is absolutely central to a full under-
standing of guilt and the pangs of conscience . . . .”); Allen Wood, Kant on Conscience 11,
http://web.stanford.edu/~allenw/webpapers/KantOnConscience.pdf (“The . . . ‘punishment’ we
suffer before the inner court of conscience is the painful feeling—a moral feeling, not an
empirical one—that arises necessarily from the influence of reason on sensibility, attendant on
the recognition that we have violated the moral law.”).
87 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
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incompatible with respecting the owners’ rights of religious freedom, and
second, that we cannot expect the corporation’s individual members to con-
verge in their moral or religious convictions and so the government should
not seek to accommodate the convictions of any of them.
A. Limited Liability
The Hobby Lobby dissent, along with some lower-court judges and
commentators,88 argues that a corporation’s owners should not “have their
corporate cake and eat it, too”89 or, more accurately, “have their veil and
pierce it too.”90 In other words, they cannot claim the protection of the cor-
porate veil where liability is concerned but have the government disregard
the veil when it comes to asserting their rights of religious exercise.91 But it
is not clear exactly why limited liability cannot arise in conjunction with
respecting the owners’ religious rights by allowing them to operate their cor-
poration in accordance with their religious convictions.
It is undoubtedly true that the corporation is a distinct legal entity.92 Just
as the “wall of separation between church and state,” to borrow Thomas
Jefferson’s words,93 is a foundational principle in constitutional law, so too
88 See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F.Supp.2d 394, 408 (E.D.
Pa. 2013) (“It would be entirely inconsistent to allow [the individual plaintiffs] to enjoy the
benefits of incorporation, while simultaneously piercing the corporate veil for the limited pur-
pose of challenging these regulations.”). For a particularly perspicuous and elaborate version
of this argument, see Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 3. See also Adam Winkler, R
Yes, Corporations Are People, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and
_politics/jurisprudence/2014/03/corporations_are_people_and_that_s_why_hobby_lobby_
should_lose_at_the_supreme.html (“What the owners want is for the Supreme Court to ‘pierce
the corporate veil’ . . . . But Hobby Lobby’s owners only want to pierce the veil for this one
issue. They want the court to vindicate their personal beliefs on birth control, yet they still
keep the protections of the corporate form for everything else, including limited liability.”).
89 Winkler, supra note 88. R
90 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1179 (Mattheson, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
91 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“By incorporating a busi-
ness, . . . an individual separates herself from the entity and escapes personal responsibility for
the entity’s obligations. One might ask why the separation should hold only when it serves the
interest of those who control the corporation.”); see also Corporate Law Professors’ Brief,
supra note 3, at 14 (“Hobby Lobby and Conestoga want to argue, in effect, that the corporate R
veil is only a one-way street: its shareholders can get protection from tort or contract liability
by standing behind the veil, but the corporation can ask a court to disregard the corporate veil
on this occasion.”).
92 Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) (“Incorporation’s
basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity with legal rights, obligations, powers, and
privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom
it employs.”); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
456–67 (1979) (“[I]t has been found necessary, when it is for the advantage of the public to
have any particular rights kept on foot and continued, to constitute artificial persons, who may
maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality. These artificial persons
are called bodies politic, bodies corporate, . . . or corporations.”).
93 Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists, LIBRARY OF CONG. (Jan.
1, 1802), available at http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html.
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the separation between the corporation and its owners constitutes the “first
principle of corporate law.”94 Further, the privilege of limited liability that
the owners enjoy as a result of this separation is celebrated as the “corpora-
tion’s most precious characteristic.”95
But it is not clear exactly what this separation between the corporation
and its owners should entail beyond limited liability. The fact that some of
the corporation’s obligations, powers, and privileges are different from those
of its owners need not entail that all must be. There is nothing in the nature
of a corporation, or in the nature of limited liability, that renders it incompat-
ible with treating the corporation as if it enjoyed rights of free exercise as a
way of respecting the free exercise rights of its members. Corporations enjoy
many rights that are grounded in the rights of their members. Rights of free
association, for example, can be ascribed to the corporation in the first in-
stance, but their purpose is not to allow the corporation to associate with
whomever (or whatever) it wishes but instead to respect the rights of the
corporation’s members to associate with one another.96
The idea that owners cannot have it both ways seems to presuppose that
the nature of the corporation is fixed, and that once the veil is in place, it
erects a complete separation between the corporation and its owners. But
just like the corporation, the veil is, to paraphrase John Marshall, “an artifi-
cial” construct, “existing only in contemplation of law.”97 As such, the ex-
tent of the veil’s coverage or porosity is a matter for the law to decide. If the
owners cannot both limit their liability and assert their constitutional rights
through the corporate form, this cannot be because of what the concept of
the veil means or what the veil or a corporation is. In other words, there is no
conceptual or metaphysical truth about the veil or the corporation upon
which opponents of corporate religious exemptions can rely.
Perhaps then the argument from limited liability turns not on some in-
herent inconsistency between limited liability and respect for the owners’
religious rights, but instead on a particular understanding of why the corpo-
ration’s owners do, or may, enjoy protection from personal liability. Two
94 Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 3, at 3. R
95 Id. at 6 (quoting WILLIAM W. COOK, THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW 19
(1925)).
96 See NAACP v. Ala. 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (finding that the NAACP was the appropriate
party to assert the individual rights to free association of its members). Some scholars have
suggested that membership organizations should be distinguished from for-profit corporations,
since the former “are deemed to share the values of their members.” Corporate Law Profes-
sors’ Brief, supra note 3, at 11. For-profit corporations, on the other hand, “are legally distinct R
entities whose shareholders may have idiosyncratic investment objectives and distinctive—and
changeable—economic needs.” Id. This is, however, an empirical, contingent claim. There is
nothing in the nature of a for-profit corporation that prevents the kind of shared purpose that
one finds in a membership organization.
97 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819); cf. Meese & Oman,
supra note 9, at 277 (“The structure of corporate governance is contingent and contractual, R
enabling shareholders of closely held corporations to unify ownership and control and exercise
the same prerogatives as owners of non-corporate businesses, such as partnerships.”).
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such arguments suggest themselves—one focusing on the rationale for the
veil, and the other focusing on case law that speaks to the extent of its
coverage.
In arguing against “reverse veil piercing” or a “values pass-through”
for the corporation, some scholars contend that the very reason to confer
limited liability undercuts veil piercing for purposes of protecting owners’
constitutional rights. These scholars note that limited liability was a legal
invention intended to further economic ends. Thus, they write, the “rationale
behind the corporate veil is simple: by creating the corporate veil, legislators
wanted to encourage entrepreneurial activity by founders, investment by
passive investors, and risk-taking by corporate managers.”98 But, they con-
tinue, allowing owners to assert their rights through the corporate form risks
making “the raising of capital more challenging, recruitment of employees
more difficult, and entrepreneurial energy less likely to flourish.”99 As such,
they conclude, allowing the owners’ values to pass through to the corpora-
tion works against the very purpose of having the veil in the first place.
In response, it is worth noting that the argument turns on highly specu-
lative claims about the purported consequences of reverse veil piercing. But
even if these consequences emerged, the argument would still be problem-
atic as it presupposes the profits-only maxim that we found contestable and
undesirable above.100 If a closely-held corporation chooses to forsake some
profits for the sake of, say, promoting philanthropy, undertaking greener
production measures, or giving its employees more vacation days, we would
not think that it had abused its veil. Why think it has done so then when it
forsakes some profits (if indeed profits will need to be forsaken) for the sake
of protecting its owners’ constitutional rights?
A second line of argument appeals to corporate law doctrine in an effort
to establish that courts have routinely rejected efforts at reverse veil pierc-
ing. The Corporate Law Professors’ Brief cites three cases for the proposition
that “corporations and their controlling shareholders cannot invoke the cor-
porate veil on the one hand and ask courts to disregard it on the other.”101
98 Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 3, at 7; see also CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, R
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: LAW AND ETHICS 23–24 (1975).
99 Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 3, at 8. R
100 See supra text accompanying notes 40–50. R
101 Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 3, at 14–16. The first of these cases, R
Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432 (1946), concerns whether a subsidiary
corporation can disregard the separation between it and its parent in order to avoid statutory
obligations. Given the parent-subsidiary element there, it is not clear what lessons the case
holds for closely-held corporations. Moreover, the fact that reverse veil piercing is inappropri-
ate when it comes to avoiding statutory obligations does not determine the propriety of reverse
veil piercing when it comes to constitutional rights. The second case cited, Moline Props., Inc.
v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943), is inapt for a similar reason because it dealt with tax liabili-
ties, not constitutional rights. There, the sole shareholder of the corporation argued, unsuccess-
fully, that a corporate sale should be treated as his own, such that the corporation should not
have to pay tax on the proceeds from the sale. The Court held that, having gained the advan-
tages of incorporation, the shareholder could not then shirk the associated disadvantages. But
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The first two of these cases urge reverse piercing as a means of avoiding
statutory obligations that would otherwise befall the corporation. In both
cases, the Court refused to disregard the veil, claiming that, economic disad-
vantages came along with the economic benefits of incorporation, and the
corporation would have to take the bad with the good.102 However well-
reasoned these cases are, it is unclear what, if any, implications they hold for
cases where owners seek to press their constitutional rights through the cor-
porate form. Statutory obligations are less hallowed than constitutional
rights. The fact that the veil prevents individual owners from bypassing the
corporate form in order to financially gain does not entail that they may not
bypass the corporate form to protect their constitutional rights. The same
holds for statutory rights that track constitutional law doctrine like RFRA.103
The third case cited in the brief, however, does involve “quasi-constitu-
tional” rights.104 In Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald,105 an African Ameri-
can sole shareholder of a corporation sued under a provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981. That provision states,
in relevant part, that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts . . . . ”106 The sole shareholder claimed that the counter-
party to the contract had breached in light of racial animus toward him. But
the contract in question had been entered into by the corporation, not its
owner, and so the Court held that the corporate owner could not bring suit in
his individual capacity. The Court did not, then, deny that owners might
press rights to equal treatment through the corporate form. Instead, it ren-
dered a far narrower ruling, holding that § 1981 applied only to the named
parties in the contract, and rejecting the owner’s claim only because he was
not a named party. As the Court stated, “[t]he fundamental point . . . is
[this]: An individual seeking to make or enforce a contract under which he
has rights will have a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1981, while one seeking to
make or enforce a contract under which someone else has rights will not.”107
the disadvantages in that case dealt with tax payments, a far cry in importance from constitu-
tional or civil rights.
102 See Schenley Distillers, 326 U.S. 432; Moline Props., 319 U.S. 436.
103 RFRA is taken to track the pre-Smith constitutional jurisprudence interpreting the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
733 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (acknowledging that the task for the court was to ascer-
tain the scope of “the right of free exercise—a right that lies at the core of our constitutional
liberties—as protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”).
104 Robin L. West, Toward a Jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Acts, in A NATION OF
WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES? THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FIFTY, (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen
Katz, eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2363036 (noting that “[c]ontemporary civil rights scholarship over-
whelmingly reflects the [notion that] our civil rights are quasi-constitutional rights to be free
of discrimination in the private as well as public world” and going on to dispute this notion).
105 Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006).
106 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2013).
107 McDonald, 546 U.S. at 475 n.2.
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In this way, McDonald had nothing to do with whether a corporation could
assert constitutional rights on behalf of its individual members.
It is worth noting as well that other courts have assigned a “race” to the
corporation, drawn from the race of its owners, and thereby permitted corpo-
rations to raise discrimination claims on their owners’ behalf.108 Indeed, the
Court in McDonald cites some of these other cases, and it declines to weigh
in on their cogency because McDonald differs on the facts. In those cases,
the corporations who were parties to the contract sued; here, by contrast, the
corporation had already settled its § 1981 claim, and the question was
whether the sole shareholder could bring a claim in his own right.109
In short, McDonald did not involve a corporation seeking to assert the
rights of its owner, as Hobby Lobby does. Instead, it involved an owner
seeking to have the corporation’s rights accrue to him. McDonald, too, then
says nothing about whether corporations can claim constitutional rights as a
means of protecting those of their owners, less still about whether a grant of
limited liability would impede such a claim.
Perhaps the argument from limited liability is better articulated not on
the basis of law as it is, but instead on the basis of law as it should be. The
thought would then be that limited liability should be conferred only in ex-
change for the owners’ agreement that they will not assert their rights
through the corporate form.110
In response, one might ask why individuals should have to forsake the
prospect of running a business in line with their religious convictions as the
price of limited liability. It might be unfair if, say, the law were to confer
limited liability on the owners but then decline to hold the corporation ac-
countable for some wrong on the ground that doing so would reduce the
value of the corporation. This arrangement would protect the owners’ wealth
in two ways—by shielding their personal wealth from liability and by ensur-
ing that the value of their stake in the corporation was not diminished as a
result of the corporation’s tortious or criminal conduct. There is a rational
relationship between limiting the owners’ liability and treating the corpora-
108 See, e.g., Carnell Const. Corp. v. Danville Redev. & Hous. Auth., 745 F.3d. 703, 716
(4th Cir. 2014) (“We agree . . . that a minority-owned corporation may establish an ‘imputed
racial identity’ for purposes of demonstrating standing to bring a claim of race discrimination
under federal law.”); Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053,
1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining the “zone of interest” protected by § 1981 claims); Oti Kaga,
Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 882 (8th Cir. 2003) (establishing standing to
proceed with claims under the Fair Housing Act); Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Grp. Prop. Mgmt.,
Inc., 295 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2002) (determining whether there is standing to claim
injury under §§ 1981, 1982).
109 McDonald, 546 U.S. at 473 n.1.
110 Cf. Kent Greenfield, Hobby Lobby Symposium: Hobby Lobby, “Unconstitutional Con-
ditions,” and Corporate Law Mistakes, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2014, 9:07 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-symposium-hobby-lobby-unconstitutional-condi-
tions-and-corporate-law-mistakes (“States create the corporate form and bestow its benefits on
entities that agree to certain conditions . . . The existential and definitional assumption is that
corporations will obey the law and not be claiming legal waivers unavailable to their
competitors.”).
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tion as liable in their stead—presumably, limited liability is conferred in
exchange for the corporation picking up the tab for the harms or wrongs it
inflicts. But there is no such connection between limited liability and a limit
on the owners’ constitutional rights.111
A final possibility for thinking that corporations should not be permit-
ted to have it both ways is raised by Mark Tushnet.112 He argues that the
owners of a for-profit firm that enjoys a religious exemption from the con-
traceptive mandate thereby gain not only the “psychic benefits” of pursuing
a business in accordance with their religious commitments; they might also
thereby gain a competitive advantage relative to their secular peers, who
operate under the mandate’s requirements.113 It is possible, then, that the
owners of a religious corporation would enjoy the economic benefits of both
limited liability and reduced healthcare coverage costs. But, Tushnet argues,
there is something unseemly about the prospect that one should get to enjoy
not only the psychic benefits of association but also pecuniary ones in enact-
ing commitments that conflict with the egalitarian underpinnings of liberal
democracy.114 The thought might be something like this:
You are free to live out your racist, sexist, or homophobic views in
your social life, but you shouldn’t be permitted to earn money
while doing so. In particular, you shouldn’t be permitted to pocket
the cost savings you reap from both limited liability and now an
exemption from a regulatory requirement and use them not for fur-
thering your religious commitments but instead [as Tushnet
writes] for “purely personal gain—a nicer house than the one
owned by investors in the for-profit gymnasium across the street, a
longer vacation than the one taken by the investors in the bakery
down the block.”115
Why shouldn’t owners of a for-profit corporation be permitted to gain in
this way? For one thing, widespread employment discrimination, even if re-
ligiously motivated, threatens to reduce the employment prospects of major
segments of the workforce, often falling on groups that already labor under
the vestiges of historical oppression. This is a key reason cited by a group of
111 Cf. Meese & Oman, supra note 9, at 286 (“[W]hether a particular shareholder’s per- R
sonal assets (if any) are available to satisfy the firm’s creditors seems normatively irrelevant to
shareholders’ ability to infuse corporations with their religious values.”).
112 Mark Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 70, 76–82, (2013).
113 Id.; cf. Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1277 (2008)
(“[Religious a]ccommodations . . . are regularly upheld even though they often have the effect
of advantaging religious actors over those who would like to act similarly for deeply held
secular reasons.”). A similar objection is voiced in the Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra
note 3, at 26–28. R
114 For support for the claim that liberalism has the resources to distinguish between dis-
criminatory and non-discriminatory commitments, and to withhold certain benefits (like tax
exemption) from the former, see Tushnet, supra note 112. R
115 Id. at 82.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\5-2\HLB202.txt unknown Seq: 25 28-MAY-15 9:23
2015] Corporate Piety and Impropriety 197
constitutional law scholars in an open letter to President Obama asking that
he not approve a religious exemption from a rule requiring federal contrac-
tors to abide by non-discriminatory practices affecting the LGBT commu-
nity.116 Framed in this way, the concern is not so much with the religious
commitment itself but instead with its effect on third parties. Third-party
effects are indeed important,117 but we have reason to object to the notion of
for-profit engagement laced with discriminatory principles even if third par-
ties are not made to bear the cost of this exercise of religion. (Suppose, for
example, that the government were to grant an exemption to for-profit enti-
ties that refuse to hire gays and lesbians on religious grounds, but it also
offered incentives for their employment with the idea that the incentives
would offset whatever reduction in employment prospects gays and lesbians
encountered in light of the exemptions.) The asserted interest may not be one
that should command any governmental respect, independent of its effect on
third parties.
Suppose, then, that we were to decide, as we should, that the govern-
ment should reject religious bids to discriminate.118 That decision would
have nothing to do with the limited liability that a corporation’s owners en-
joy. If religiously-based discrimination warrants no respect, this is true for
sole proprietorships and partnerships as much as it is for corporate owners,
even though sole proprietorships and partners do not enjoy limited liability.
In other words, it cannot be the case that the reason to deny for-profit corpo-
rations a right to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation is because
they enjoy limited liability.119 The notion that there is a default right to dis-
criminate, but that one cashes that right in once one elects an organizational
form providing limited liability, does violence both to the notion of rights
and the wrong of discrimination.120
116 Letter from Katherine Franke et al. to Barack Obama, President of the United States
(July 14, 2014), available at https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gen-
der-sexuality/executive_order_letter_final_0.pdf. See generally Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Erik
Eckholm, Faith Groups Seek Exclusion from Bias Rule, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/us/faith-groups-seek-exclusion-from-bias-rule.html?_r=0.
117 See Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015) (arguing that third-party effects should figure in the RFRA doctrine more prominently
than they do now).
118 This is precisely what the open letter to President Obama urges. Letter from Katherine
Franke et al., supra note 116. R
119 The Corporate Law Professors’ Brief raises a concern about competitive advantage
unconnected to limited liability. See supra note 3, at 26–28. The argument there is that, if an R
exemption is good for business, corporations will assert religious objections whether or not
these are sincere, in an effort to enhance the corporation’s bottom line. The argument, however,
rests on speculative empirical premises. Moreover, it is not limited to the corporation. Sole
proprietors and partnerships may be no less motivated to affect religion for pecuniary gain. If
doubts about sincerity should give us pause, or invite concern about the capacity of courts to
distinguish genuine from false beliefs, then we should worry about any and all bids for exemp-
tion from regulations grounded in (asserted) religious beliefs. See also Meese & Oman, supra
note 9, at 293. R
120 Put another way, rights are not commodities. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE 100–103 (1983). See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY
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In sum, limited liability does not place a constraint on whether corpora-
tions may be treated as if they have RFRA rights. Treating the corporation as
such has the potential to protect the rights of religious freedom of the corpo-
ration’s members, who do not lose these rights as the price of gaining limited
liability.
Before moving on, however, I note that the whole concept of reverse
veil piercing or a values pass-through121 is tendentious, if not question-beg-
ging. The idea that recognizing the owners’ constitutional rights requires that
we “pierce” the corporate veil suggests that, as a default matter, the veil
does in fact occlude the owners’ constitutional rights. Their rights may be
protected, then, only if the default is altered—altered in a way that rends the
veil and thereby allows the owners’ rights to poke through, as it were. At
least in the wake of Hobby Lobby, though, we might deny that the default
coverage the veil provides prevents members from asserting their constitu-
tional rights through the corporate form. Instead, we should conceive of the
veil in the first instance as providing nowhere near as much coverage as
those who argue from limited liability would contend.
B. Diverging Religious Commitments of Members
It may be that what makes it unfair to allow the owners to assert their
constitutional rights through the corporate form is not that they enjoy limited
liability but instead that the owners do not speak for all of the corporation’s
members.122 The owners might disagree among themselves about what relig-
ion, if any, the corporation should adopt, thereby inviting “contentious
shareholder meetings, disruptive proxy contests, and expensive litigation”
on the issue.123 Moreover, the corporation’s employees may not share the
owners’ religious convictions. Where this is so, the dissent and others argue,
courts threaten to violate the Establishment Clause if they grant exemptions
on the basis of convictions of the owners that are not shared by the
employees.124
(2012). With that said, the Supreme Court has in recent years begun to commodify certain
constitutional rights. Eric Orts and I describe and critique this phenomenon in Constitutional
Commodification (Nov 4, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
121 Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 3, at 19. R
122 See, e.g., Margaret Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Eric Orts, The Legal and
Social Ontology of the Firm, THE CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.theconglomer
ate.org/2014/08/the-legal-and-social-ontology-of-the-firm.html.
123 Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 3, at 10. R
124 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[Prior to Hobby Lobby, RFRA] exemptions had never been extended to any
entity operating in the ‘commercial, profit-making world’ . . . . The reason why is hardly
obscure. Religious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same
religious faith. Not so of for-profit corporations. Workers who sustain the operations of those
corporations commonly are not drawn from one religious community.”); see also Korte v.
Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 722 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2903 (2014) (“Like any secular employer in a religiously pluralistic nation, the Kortes and the
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The argument presupposes that both the owners and the employees are
the kind of members of the corporation who are entitled to have their rights
asserted through the corporate form. But the presupposition is flawed, at
least when it comes to identifying the corporation’s acts with its members.
To see this recall that Hobby Lobby’s owners worry that, because its
acts redound to them, they bear moral responsibility where Hobby Lobby
commits or facilitates a wrong—here, according to the owners’ religious be-
liefs, by subsidizing health insurance that includes “abortifacients.”125 Set-
ting aside for now the question of whether the subsidization does involve the
owners in a wrong, the owners are right in thinking that they bear responsi-
bility for Hobby Lobby’s acts.
In general, and as I have argued at length elsewhere,126 we have more
reason to attribute the corporation’s acts to some of its members than others.
In particular, those who have authority over the way the corporation is run
and the corporate identity itself bear responsibility for the corporation’s acts,
independent of whether they participated directly in those acts.127 It is for
this reason that we do and should blame these members for corporate
wrongs, just as we do and should praise them for corporate feats. In the case
of Hobby Lobby, the corporate owners are also the corporation’s manag-
ers128—they are most implicated in the corporation’s identity and operations.
The rank-and-file employees are not in the same boat. They do not set pol-
icy, contribute to the corporate vision, or articulate or safeguard its mission.
They are not expected to support the corporation in the way that its owners
do—for example, by exhibiting strong loyalty to the corporation, privileging
the corporation’s interests over their own, or experiencing pride in the face
of its accomplishments and shame (and perhaps also guilt) in the face of its
misdeeds. For all of these reasons, Hobby Lobby’s acts are not the acts of the
stores’ cashiers, custodial staff, or store clerks. By contrast, Hobby Lobby’s
owners should feel more implicated in its acts and, as such,, courts have
Grotes must realize that their companies employ individuals who do not share their own relig-
ious beliefs and who may choose to use their wages and benefits in ways that are offensive to
those beliefs.”); Corbin, supra note 9; Sepper, supra note 10, at 319 (“In the case of disagree- R
ing shareholders, whose beliefs matter? And what of employees who may not share the own-
ers’ beliefs?”); Orts, supra note 122 (“[Corporations] are moral creatures because the people R
who compose them are moral creatures . . . . But we then have to dig deeper and ask ‘who’ is
involved in the firm . . . . Perhaps some kinds of firms should have religious rights, but the
scope of these potential rights should be constrained. Rights of employees may be equal to
those of owners and managers in this context.”).
125 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
126 See Amy J. Sepinwall, Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate Criminal Law, 40 J.
CORP. L. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Crossing the Fault Line]; Amy J. Sepinwall, Re-
sponsibility for Historical Injustices: Reconceiving the Case for Reparations, 22 J. L. & POL.
183 (2006).
127 See Crossing the Fault Line, supra note 126. R
128 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765 (“David, Barbara, and their children retain exclu-
sive control of both companies . . . . David serves as the CEO of Hobby Lobby, and his three
children serve as the president, vice president, and vice CEO.”) (citation omitted).
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reason to privilege the religious convictions of the owners and to allow the
corporation to be run in a way that respects those convictions.
To be clear, Hobby Lobby should not be read to stand for the proposi-
tion that every corporation’s owners may impose their religious beliefs on
the corporation. Instead, courts should undertake a case-by-case assessment
identifying how the corporation is run, who has the most authority over its
identity, and who therefore has the most reason to feel implicated in its acts.
Where multiple constituent groups enjoy near equal control and yet diverge
in their religious convictions, courts should deny a religious exemption that
some but not all of these groups seek. Were courts to do otherwise, they
would violate the Establishment Clause.
By contrast, where one set of constituents clearly predominates over the
others, that set should be permitted to decide on the corporation’s moral and
religious commitments. Determining which set that set is is not a matter
newly prompted by the Hobby Lobby decision. Anytime a corporation shifts
its values, it invites the prospect that some of its members will contest the
shift. So long as those who disagree with the corporation’s decision were not
unduly disregarded, the mere fact of disagreement is no cause for concern.
In this respect, then, Justice Alito appears to have been correct in asserting
that concerns about divergence between the religious convictions of different
corporate constituents could be addressed through existing state corporate
law,129 as state corporate law has long had occasion to consider such con-
flicts.130 At any rate, the fact that members may disagree as to the religious
posture within their corporation should not preclude those corporations
whose members speak in a unified voice from having their corporation re-
flect their religious views.
C. Corporate Religious Freedom vs. Statutory Entitlements
The question to which Hobby Lobby gives rise, however, is not merely
whose values the corporation will embody but also whose statutory entitle-
ments the corporation will satisfy. In respecting the corporate owners’ relig-
ious convictions, Hobby Lobby satisfies the owners’ RFRA rights, but it does
so at the expense of the rights to contraceptive coverage that the ACA is
meant to afford Hobby Lobby’s employees and their dependents. The issue
would then be not whether the owners’ values or religious convictions
should eclipse those of the employees’, but instead whether the owners’ val-
129 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774–75.
130 Justice Alito, id., cites 1 J. COX & T. HAZEN, TREATISE OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§§14:11, 3:2 (3d ed. 2010) in support of his contention that state corporate law governs such
conflicts. See also Johnson & Millon, supra note 34 at 27–28 (elaborating on the state law R
voting procedures for resolving such conflicts). See generally RALPH NADER, MARK J. GREEN
& JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1977); PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW
(Lawrence Mitchell ed., 1995); Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?:
Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
109 (2004).
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ues should be given voice when doing so impinges on the rights of the em-
ployees—not religious rights, but rights to a good or service that Congress
has guaranteed.
Notice, first, that so described, this is not a question about how to man-
age a value conflict between different corporate constituents. Instead, it is to
accept that the owners enjoy authority to decide the corporation’s values and
then ask the question whether that authority should be cabined in instances
when the owners’ values threaten individuals’ legitimate interests—here, in-
terests backed by a statutory entitlement scheme. In this way, commentators
confuse matters when they conflate the corporate constituent and statutory
entitlement issues.131
Second, I acknowledge that the prospect that the law would extend an
accommodation at the expense of third parties is indeed troubling.132 But it is
worth noting that it is tendentious and unhelpful to contend that Hobby
Lobby’s owners enjoy an accommodation at the expense of the women
whose contraception it would otherwise have had to subsidize. What the
ACA guarantees employees and their dependents is access to cost-free con-
traception, not access to employer-subsidized contraception. The right way
to characterize an accommodation, then, is to say that the government should
respect Hobby Lobby’s owners’ religious objection to contraception, and, as
a result, it should provide the affected women with cost-free contraception in
Hobby Lobby’s stead. And we, concerned citizens, should hold the govern-
ment to both sides of this obligation. In short, Hobby Lobby did, and should
have, enjoyed an accommodation only because the government can provide
one without imposing any significant costs on third parties. Having granted
the exemption, the government now incurs an obligation to alleviate any
costs that would otherwise befall third parties—an obligation it is poised to
meet, given the work-around it has already developed for religious non-
profits.133
With that said, it is true that not all accommodations that allow an em-
ployer to withdraw from providing statutory benefits to its employees can be
granted so neatly. Elsewhere, I argue that the doctrine around religious ac-
131 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alterna-
tives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 153,
170 (2015) (characterizing as “callous” Hobby Lobby’s claim that “RFRA should be read to
protect a multi-billion dollar corporation against a marginal increase in its operating expenses
as the cost of observing its religious beliefs against IUDs and other emergency contraception,
but not to prevent the same corporation from shifting the costs of that observance onto lower-
income employees and dependents who believe and practice differently”) (footnote omitted);
SCOTUS Fails Women: Hobby Lobby Decision Gives Bosses Right to Deny Women Birth
Control: Puts the Burden on Women to Pay Increasing Costs, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN N.Y.C.
(Jun. 30, 2014), http://nownyc.org/reproductive-rights/pregnancy/hobby-lobby/ (“Today our
Supreme Court ruled that the religious freedom and healthcare needs of tens of thousands of
women matter less than the religious beliefs of corporations.”).
132 I engage this issue at length in Sepinwall, supra note 117 (manuscript at 63–67) (on R
file with author).
133 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2014).
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commodation needs to be much more sensitive to the effects of accommoda-
tions on third parties, and I contend that accommodations should be denied
where third-party costs would be unjustifiably large.134 The concerns I ad-
dress there arise whenever accommodating someone’s claims of conscience
threatens to impose costs upon others; the question of for-profit religious
exercise raises no distinctive issues.
By contrast, the discussion here has had two more pointed aims. First,
concerns about whose views or values the corporation should represent is
not new to Hobby Lobby; for-profit corporations often seek to adopt moral
or religious commitments, and in each of these instances, the corporation
must decide whose commitments to adopt, on pain of violating state corpo-
rate law if it privileges a corporate constituent that has no right to graft its
commitments onto the corporate form. Second, we should resist the view
that, in securing an exemption, Hobby Lobby’s owners inflict the costs of
their religious adherence on their employees and the employees’ dependents.
Instead, we should read the case as standing for the proposition that an ex-
emption may be granted only where the government can ensure that third
parties—the women whose contraception Hobby Lobby would otherwise
subsidize—are not thereby made to incur significant costs, and we should
hold the government to the obligation to protect third parties that the exemp-
tion imposes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The upshot of this Article’s arguments is that corporations are not relig-
ious, but corporations may be treated as if they possess rights of religious
freedom as a way of protecting the religious freedom rights of the corpora-
tion’s controlling members. The considerations marshaled in support of these
arguments provide some limits on the implications and applications of
Hobby Lobby going forward. More specifically, the arguments here provide
a way of discerning which rights corporations may enjoy: because corpora-
tions lack key attributes of moral or metaphysical personhood, any rights
they enjoy must be grounded in the rights of their members.
Two implications follow once we recognize that it is the individual
members’ rights that undergird an assertion of rights on the part of the corpo-
ration. First, the corporation can protect its members’ rights only if the rele-
vant members—that is, the ones who bear responsibility for the corporation’s
acts—converge in their understanding of the way in which they want to
exercise the rights in question. Where the controlling members lack this
unity, courts should refrain from granting their corporation an exemption.
Second, even where the controlling members do speak as one, it may still
make sense to deny them the opportunity to assert their rights through the
corporate form. That is, before granting corporations new rights, govern-
134 Sepinwall, supra note 117 (manuscript at 63–67) (on file with author). R
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ments or the courts must ascertain whether the members’ rights require trans-
position to the corporate form in order for those rights to receive their full
effect. Thus, for example, individual rights of conscience should extend to
the corporation so that individuals do not have to leave their religious con-
victions at the corporate door (assuming that the corporation’s controlling
members converge in their religious convictions). But individual voting
rights should not entail corporate voting rights because it is not an assault on
voting rights to hold that they may be exercised only in an individual capac-
ity. After all, we are a nation committed to the principle of one-person, one-
vote.135 To allow individuals to exercise their voting rights both as individu-
als and through the corporate form would violate this principle.
In short, as a result of the considerations adduced here, we can identify
which corporations may seek to assert the rights of their members, which
members’ rights are relevant, and which of these rights warrant assertion
through the corporate form. But there is still much that remains unresolved.
Most significantly, to say that the corporation may seek to assert its mem-
bers’ rights is not to say that the law must yield to that assertion. Nothing
here determines when the law should accommodate a valid corporate asser-
tion of rights in the face of a general law of neutral application to which the
corporation objects. That determination turns on an inquiry into the proper
scope of claims of complicity: when do the corporation’s controlling mem-
bers have reason to feel complicit in its acts? And, where these members do
have reasonable concerns about complicity, when would it be acceptable to
grant the corporation an exemption that imposes costs upon third parties136
(as an exemption from the contraceptive mandate might were the govern-
ment not to provide an alternative means of access to contraception to
Hobby Lobby’s female employees)?137 Much work then remains before we
know when a for-profit corporation can enjoy an exemption given the rights
of its individual members. Still, this Article sheds light on the proper place
and role of the corporation in society—light that should allay fears of corpo-
135 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
558 (1964).
136 I take up questions of complicity, third-party costs, and religious exemptions in
Sepinwall, supra note 117. R
137 While the Hobby Lobby opinion made much of the fact that the government had al-
ready instituted a work-around to the contraceptive mandate for non-profit institutions that
objected to contraception, see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2782
(2014), the Court sowed doubt on the viability of this work-around three days after issuing
Hobby Lobby, when it ordered the government to find a work-around for this work-around. See
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
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rate domination while satisfying those who believe that individuals should
be able to live out their religious convictions at home, at worship, and at
work.138
138 In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy defends the extension of RFRA to the for-
profit corporation on precisely these grounds. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“Free exercise in this sense implicates more than just freedom of belief. It means,
too, the right to express those beliefs and to establish one’s religious (or nonreligious) self-
definition in the political, civic, and economic life of our larger community.”) (emphasis ad-
ded) (citation omitted); see also Joey Fishkin, Hobby Lobby and the Politics of Recognition,
BALKINZATION (June 30, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-and-politics-
of-recognition.html (“[R]eligion is not something people do on their own time, in their own
churches, but rather, is a way that apparently even large for-profit businesses may conduct
their affairs.”); Sarah Green, The Hobby Lobby Decision: How Business Got Here, HBR
BLOG NETWORK (July 3, 2014), http://blogs.hbr.org/2014/07/the-hobby-lobby-decision-how-
business-got-here/ (“ ‘A state that takes seriously its obligations to respect religious free exer-
cise has to understand that individuals are not going to want to leave their religious convictions
at the corporate office door.’”) (quoting Amy Sepinwall).
